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Abstract 
In congested urban areas, it remains a pressing challenge to reduce unnecessary vehicle circling 
for parking while at the same time maximize parking space utilization.  In observance of new 
information technologies that have become readily accessible to drivers and parking agencies, we 
develop a dynamic non-cooperative bi-level model (i.e. Stackelberg leader-follower game) to set 
parking prices in real-time for effective parking access and space utilization.  The model is 
expected to fit into an integrated parking pricing and management system, where parking 
reservations and transactions are facilitated by sensing and informatics infrastructures, that ensures 
the availability of convenient spaces at equilibrium market prices.  It is shown with numerical 
examples that the proposed dynamic parking pricing model has the potential to virtually eliminate 
vehicle circling for parking, which results in significant reduction in adverse socioeconomic 
externalities such as traffic congestion and emissions. 
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1. Introduction 
In practically all major cities, the time and frustration associated with finding a parking space 
during peak hours not only upsets drivers, but also significantly decreases the city’s economic, 
environmental, and social sustainability.  The economic impact, measured in terms of wasted 
resources (time or fuel) and lost economic potential, is the most visible.  On average, 8.1 minutes 
are wasted each time a driver circles around a U.S. city in search of a parking space (Shoup, 2005).  
This extra circling accounts for up to 30% of urban traffic congestion, and generates an extra 4,927 
vehicle-miles-travelled (VMT) per parking space per year (Shoup, 2006).  A large portion of this 
circling occurs in densely developed downtown areas.  Additionally, according to a survey in Year 
2011, 60% of the responded drivers reported that at least once they were so frustrated searching 
for parking that they eventually gave up, leaving behind only congestion and lost economic 
opportunity (IBM, 2011).  The environmental impacts are also significant.  In a large city such as 
Chicago (with over 35,000 parking spaces), the excess vehicle distance caused by circling burns 
8.37 million gallons of gasoline into an extra 129,000 tons of CO2 each year (Ayala et al., 2012).   
Due to these economic and environmental issues, management of urban parking, via pricing 
schemes for example, is often necessary.  Such efforts can impose significant social impacts, 
including direct influences on travel demand and equity issues.  For example, outdated parking 
policies such as free or tax-exempt parking in essence provide a subsidy to those owning and 
operating a vehicle, which may be worth hundreds of dollars per motorist per year (Litman, 2005).  
This subsidy, often also seen as one approach to demand management, tends to favor wealthier 
car-owning households and may divert investments from alternative transportation modes (such 
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as pedestrian, bicycling, or transit).  However, regardless of the city’s mode split, it is important 
to efficiently utilize the parking resources allocated to car owners, as they are also important 
customers of the local economy.  While easy to implement, spatially and/or temporally invariant 
parking management strategies, common in many cities’ parking meter programs, may not be able 
to optimally regulate parking demand, which results in congestion and lost economic potential. 
The rapid advances of information technology in recent years hold the promise to bring in a 
new paradigm of parking management systems that can reduce the negative externalities 
associated with urban parking.  However, this new paradigm, commonly referred to as “smart 
parking,” faces three types of barriers: political, technological, and operational.  The political and 
technological barriers were lowered significantly over the past decade with the empirical 
implementation of several full-scale systems that include real-time occupancy sensing, public 
information dissemination, electronic payments, and so forth.  The pilot SFpark variable pricing 
program in San Francisco, for example, has shown the possibility of overcoming the political 
barrier to time-varying parking policies.  Hence, the biggest remaining barrier is operational, which 
focuses on effectively managing urban parking while considering infrastructures, policies, 
enforcement, and general operations.  In particular, demand management, often accomplished 
through parking pricing, is critical to efficient parking operations.  To the authors’ best knowledge, 
no demand management strategies yet exist (beyond experimental) that are able to utilize dynamic 
and real-time information to improve efficiency, equity, and the user experience and in turn 
mitigate congestion and other social and environmental issues.  The working mechanism of such 
a management system should also be easily understood by drivers and other stakeholders. 
Even with real-time information, the implementation of new parking systems that will affect 
thousands of people every day is complex.  Most existing models predict travel and parking 
demand based on historic data, but unfortunately fail to address complex interactions among 
various parking supply/demand factors and the interrelationships among pricing/travel/parking 
decisions.  In reality, the decision-making process of the stakeholders (e.g. parking agency, 
individual drivers) often involves complicated gaming behaviors.  On one hand, the agency’s 
parking management strategies (e.g. pricing) directly affect drivers’ travel and parking decisions, 
which in turn influence the parking demand.  On the other hand, drivers with different origins, 
destinations, and socioeconomic characteristics compete against one another for limited parking 
resources at popular locations, and this competition eventually shapes the parking market and 
pricing at equilibrium.  Integrating multiple layers of such decisions into one overarching modeling 
framework is challenging, as it involves different stakeholders who have independent and 
sometimes conflicting objectives. 
This paper presents a new parking pricing and management system that incorporates ideas 
from variable pricing (e.g. SFpark), on- and off-street parking reservation systems (e.g. Xerox, 
ParkWhiz), game theory, and downtown parking economics (see Arnott et al., 2013).  The primary 
goal of this paper is to develop a dynamic, demand based real-time pricing model to optimally 
allocate parking spaces in busy urban centers, thus reducing congestion and other negative 
economic and environmental costs.  This pricing model is online in nature and is able to react to 
real-time demand variations.  It allows a parking agency to set system optimal pricing policies 
(e.g. to minimize congestion, maximize social surplus, maximize revenue) while considering user 
competition and market equilibrium.  Additionally, analysis of this pricing model provides insights 
into practical solution techniques for complex bi-level programming problems, i.e. mathematical 
programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs), in dynamic settings.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature related to 
smart parking, the existing variable pricing systems, and state-of-the-art modeling methods.  
Section 3 presents the assumptions, notation, and formulation of the proposed non-cooperative 
Stackelberg leader-follower game model for dynamic parking pricing.  A solution approach is 
developed by transforming the bi-level MPEC into a solvable single-level mixed-integer quadratic 
program (MIQP) that is implemented in a rolling-horizon scheme.  Section 4 illustrates the 
performance and potential impacts of the proposed dynamic pricing model using a numerical 
example based on an urban neighborhood in SFpark’s current system.  Section 5 concludes the 
paper and discusses possible future research. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
Problems associated with urban parking have gained considerable attention over the past decade.  
Shoup (2005) provides a meticulous summary of the status-quo of parking management and a 
number of innovative ideas.  Using ideas from the book, the pilot SFpark program successfully 
applied demand responsive performance-based pricing to seven neighborhoods in San Francisco.  
The underlying theory is that if there is always one open space on each block, drivers can 
immediately find an open space that suits their preferences, which would virtually eliminate 
circling for parking.  The program uses recorded occupancy data to raise or lower meter and garage 
prices every six weeks with the goal of achieving a target occupancy level (e.g. 85% on average) 
on every street block during every time period (e.g. morning, afternoon, evening).  Another pricing 
model by Xerox® utilizes historic data to predict future parking demand and set parking prices 
accordingly.  This model, currently implemented in Los Angeles’s LA ExpressPark™ program, 
can take special events into account, but also updates pricing tables rather infrequently (i.e. only 
once every several weeks).  Unfortunately, for both programs, such long intervals between price 
updates limit the models’ ability to handle anything other than an average parking demand. 
It is now possible to collect accurate information dynamically and use it to predict real-time 
demand (Caicedo et al., 2012).  Information technology and its subset of “smart parking” 
applications have evolved rapidly over the past decade.  Several companies have heavily invested 
in “smart parking” technologies and are continuously improving their products as competition 
heats up to serve the growing demand (e.g. Streetline, Fybr, Deteq, Libelium, etc.).  Current state-
of-the-art parking technologies include hockey puck sized sensors recording real-time occupancy 
data, instant electronic payment options, dynamic message signs, smartphone applications that 
allow reservation of garage parking, and much more.  Communication between the parking agency 
and users is typically via smartphone and web applications, with forthcoming integration into 
vehicles’ on-board navigation systems.  Despite all these technological advances, however, few 
existing urban parking models are currently capable of utilizing such real-time information to 
enhance urban parking. 
The transition to a more responsive and dynamic model is not trivial, however.  Current efforts 
are limited to the closed confines of parking garages assuming that the operator has complete 
control of the environment, which is rarely the case in reality.  For example, Geng and Cassandras 
(2011) developed a system to dynamically assign and reserve user optimal parking spaces in real-
time for a single parking garage.  Such model assumes a centralized system that unfortunately does 
not capture drivers’ independent/competing decision-making processes and the agency’s pricing 
leverage.  Nor does it consider congestion reduction as an important objective for on-street 
parking.  Ayala et al. (2011; 2012) developed models that help authorities set parking prices that 
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attempt to minimize system-wide driving distances.  Their pricing schemes are offline in nature, 
assuming a static parking demand that does not change over time.  Therefore, it is not clear how 
their models can be implemented in a large-scale and dynamic real-world environment. 
Recently, Qian and Rajagopala (2013) developed a model showing the promise of real-time 
pricing in achieving system optimal objectives.  Given the dynamic traffic demand on a general 
network, and assuming user equilibrium travel behavior, they show that lot-based pricing schemes 
can achieve system optimal parking flow patterns that minimize total cost, including users’ parking 
search time within the parking facility.  Further, because parking price and parking occupancy 
assume a one-to-one mapping in their model, optimal real-time prices can be set solely based on 
real-time occupancy levels, provided the information is disseminated to users in real-time.  This 
would allow parking pricing changes similar to SFpark except in real-time, if their assumptions 
regarding approximations to parking search times prove valid.  However, the typical search time 
function used as the basis in their model was developed for a German off-street parking guidance 
system and may not apply directly to on-street search times, although results from Levy et al. 
(2012) suggest a similar shape.  Regardless, the paper focused on morning commute scenarios for 
large centrally owned off-street parking facilities.  Further research into all-day on- and off-street 
parking scenarios should provide interesting results appropriate for downtown urban areas posed 
with challenging parking management situations.  The management of such parking systems 
involves non-cooperative decision making between the parking agency and the users in the 
network.  However, in their paper, the dynamic pricing from the parking agency’s point of view is 
not discussed, including the impact of travelers’ choices on the agency’s optimal strategy 
accounting for revenue and/or other social objectives. 
Game theoretic models that allow hierarchical yet integrated decision making are particularly 
useful for this parking management problem.  The Stackelberg leader-follower model and its 
MPEC formulations have been widely applied to hierarchical decision making in transportation 
planning, economics, engineering design, etc.  Luo et al. (1996) provided a good review of the 
fundamental results in MPECs.  Such models effectively capture multiple stakeholders’ individual 
decisions while designing management strategies to achieve a system objective -- such as the 
transportation network design (NDP) problems in Abdulaal and Leblanc (1979), Yang and Bell 
(2001), Small, (1992), Giuliano, (1994), Daniel, (1995), Lu (2006), etc.; and competitive supply 
chain problems in Bai et al. (2012, 2014).  MPECs are in general difficult due to the inherent non-
convexity and non-smoothness.  Solution methods were developed for the linear/quadratic 
program with linear complementarity constraints (LP/QPCC), e.g. see Bai et al. (2013) and Hu et 
al. (2008; 2012), and discretely constrained (DC-) MPECs (Bai et al., 2012; 2014).  However, the 
problem scales up rather quickly such that the existing methods’ ability to solve larger problem 
instances is very limited.  In this paper, we develop a dynamic MPEC model for one parking 
agency and many independent users, with the objective of finding optimal prices and equilibrium 
parking choices for an urban neighborhood in a multi-interval time horizon.  Due to high 
complexities, we develop a rolling horizon solution approach that is able to integrate both historic 
data and real-time information into the optimal solutions for each time interval.  The static MPEC 
problem for each time interval is then reformulated into an equivalent quadratic MIQP that can be 
solved by existing solvers. 
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3. Methodology 
Advancing the parking management paradigm to a dynamic and performance-based one requires 
the development of a reliable pricing model as well as the design of the technological infrastructure 
within which the model will operate.  Section 3.1 below briefly introduces the technological 
infrastructure requirements.  Section 3.2 outlines the model formulation and associated 
assumptions for the pricing model, while Section 3.3 presents the solution techniques. 
 
3.1. System Infrastructures 
Mackowski et al. (2014) provides an overview of the infrastructure requirements and 
implementation details.  Most of the technological infrastructure can be built upon that of the 
current “smart parking” systems; e.g. those providing space availability information as well as 
route guidance (Parker™ by Streetline, Merge® by Xerox, etc.) to the users in real-time.  
Nevertheless, several key components must be added to allow the pricing model to perform to its 
full potential.   
The primary component needed is a reservation system for on-street parking.  Currently, 
parking garages are able to offer reservations to users via a website or smartphone app (e.g. 
SpotHero, ParkWhiz) to ensure that a space is available when the user arrives.  Extending this 
concept to on-street parking is possible if access to spaces can be similarly controlled.  Networked 
indicators that light up red when a space is reserved are inexpensive and easy to install on parking 
meters.  To honor parking reservations, parking enforcement officers may have access to a 
communication system that sends them the correct license plate and alerts them when and where 
a vehicle is parked illegally so they can target their enforcement and lower the rate of violations.  
PARC (Xerox’s research group) is currently developing prototypes of this technology to 
demonstrate its feasibility in real-world urban applications (U.S. Patent No. 8,671,002, 2014).  
This reservation component will expand the market for available parking spaces (from just local 
vehicles to all users travelling to nearby destinations), allow users to quickly find the best available 
space during each trip, and provide better user experiences.  Additionally, the recent work by Liu 
et al. (2013) has shown that devoting a portion of the overall parking supply to spaces requiring 
reservations can reduce bottleneck congestion by smoothing out traffic arrivals – at least during 
the morning commute. 
The technological infrastructure must also collect live data to support pricing decisions in real-
time.  Partial demand data will be provided by the reservation system, and complete occupancy 
information will be provided by sensors in each parking space.  Such data streams, after being 
cleaned of any noise or inaccuracies, will be combined with historic occupancy and demand data, 
as well as other relevant data (e.g. street closures, sports events), to provide adequate information 
for real-time future demand prediction.  These real-time data serve as the input for the proposed 
model to make pricing adjustments. 
 
3.2. Model Formulation 
Now we will present a dynamic MPEC formulation of a Stackelberg leader-follower game model 
that determines parking prices and management strategies in real-time.  This model addresses 
spatial and temporal variations in parking demand, as well as complex interactions among multiple 
stakeholders.   
We consider a city neighborhood and a set of discrete time intervals in a time horizon T .  A 
set of discrete parking areas J within the neighborhood is defined by block face for on-street 
parking and/or by parking lot for off-street parking.  J includes only the parking areas in our system 
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within the neighborhood, and other nearby parking areas, such as private parking or areas managed 
by other agencies, are termed “outside lots.”2  Area j J  has a capacity 
jc .  The parking agency’s 
main decision is the price of each parking area at each time interval { }tjpp .  The traffic demand 
is generated from a set of origins O, e.g. traffic analysis zones (TAZs), and goes toward a set of 
destinations D.  A driver from origin o O  to destination d D  may arrive at the parking 
neighborhood at time t T  and have a desired parking duration of  1,2,...,n N  time intervals.  
The total elastic demand of each type of driver (i.e. whom we will call “users”), specified by the 
origin, destination, arrival time, and parking duration, follows an inverse demand function ( )H   of 
the equilibrium disutility ,t n
odu  of this type of demand.  The equilibrium disutility 
,t n
odu , identical for 
all users of this type regardless of their choice of parking area j, is measured by the parking price 
t
jp , the cost for required driving ojv  between origin o and area j, and that for walking jdw  between 
area j and destination d.  The costs for the latter two can be estimated from the respective 
indifference curves (i.e. θ and θ' ) between monetary cost and travel times, assuming perfect 
substitution.  We let ,
,
t n
j odh  be the number of users choosing to park at area j.  The limited total 
parking capacity across all areas in our system may not be sufficient or competitive to serve all the 
demand.  In such cases, part of the users are assumed to lose service or choose lots outside of our 
system.  For model simplicity, we do not consider the detailed spatial distribution of outside lots, 
but rather include a dummy lot, denoted by ζ with sufficiently large capacity to absorb all excessive 
demand that is lost from our system.  Hence, 
 
,
,
t n
j od
j J
h
 
 = ,( )t nodH u .  Finally, it is assumed that 
users lock in and pay the same price t
jp  per time interval if they start to park at interval t.  The 
occupancy of parking area j at time t, t
jf , satisfies conservation over time based on the amounts 
of entering users, 
 
,
1,2,...
t n
j
n N
q

 , and departing users, 
1
,
max(1, )
t
t m t m
j j
m t N
g q


 
  .   
The mathematical model, developed from the parking agency's perspective, takes the form of 
a dynamic MPEC.  It has the parking agency’s problem in the upper level and users’ collective 
parking choice equilibrium in the lower level.  The parking agency is the leader and sets the time- 
and location-specific prices.  The primary objective is to minimize the absolute difference of actual 
occupied parking spots in each parking area j from its target level j jc , where j  is the ideal 
percentage occupancy, at a penalty of β per spot per time interval.  Secondary objectives such as 
maximizing social surplus (consumer plus agency surpluses) and maximizing revenue can also be 
added with respective weights  and s r  .  This is illustrated in the objective function of the upper 
level problem below.  
 
(upper level) 
   
 
, ,
, max
,
1,2,... 1,2,...
,
1,2,...
1
min  ( )
2
                                         
s
s s
s s
s
t t
t t t n t n
j j j s j j j od
t t j J t t j J n N n N o O d D
t
t t n
r j j
t t j J n N
c f n p q h u u
n p q
 

 


 

 
     

 
 
       
 
  
    
 
f,p,q,h,u g
  (1.1) 
                                                          
2 Private parking areas outside the agency’s ownership could be included within our system if the parking prices and 
availability, as well as the capacity and location, are known at each time interval. 
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 1s.t.  -  ,  , ,...t tl j j r s sp p j J t t t  
           (1.2) 
         ,  , ,...tj j j s sp j J t t t            (1.3) 
 
 1 ,
1,2,...
       ,  , ,...t t t t nj j j j s s
n N
f f g q j J t t t 

           (1.4) 
   , ,,       ,  , 1,2,... , ,...
t n t n
j j od s s
o O d D
q h j J n N t t t 
 
          (1.5) 
 
1
,
max(1, )
       ,  , ,...
t
t m t m
j j s s
m t N
g q j J t t t 


 
         (1.6) 
 
Note that the model is formulated on a rolling horizon of τ intervals, for all 1,2,...,st T .  The first 
term in (1.1) pushes parking space allocation toward the target occupancy levels.  Social surplus 
is captured by the second term in (1.1).  It only considers direct consumer and agency surpluses 
and does not include external benefits or impacts such as congestion, vehicular emissions, and so 
on.  The third term captures the agency’s parking pricing revenue.  The most likely constraints that 
the agency must satisfy are those related to pricing policies set by city legislation or those related 
to public acceptance.  In the above formulation, Constraints (1.2) and (1.3) impose an upper r  
and lower l  limit to price variations between consecutive time intervals, and a minimum j  and 
maximum 
j  price that each parking area may take, respectively.
3  Constraints (1.4) preserve the 
conservation of available parking spaces between time intervals.  Constraints (1.5) and (1.6) define 
the total demand arriving at and leaving each parking area at time interval t , respectively.   
A measure of system performance could be the amount of demand that choose not to use our 
system (i.e. defined as “lost users”).  Some users will inevitably be “lost” to parking outside of the 
system (e.g. hotel, restaurant).4  However, users can also be lost when they cannot find an available 
parking space and give up searching, either taking their business elsewhere or going home, which 
is undesirable.  Therefore, this model sets prices near market prices5 to encourage as many users 
as possible to use this system while allocating them optimally and without exceeding the target 
occupancy level.  Additional performance metrics will be discussed below in the context of the 
model’s lower level formulation.   
In the lower level, individual drivers act as followers.  They decide where to park based on the 
spatial distribution of available parking spaces, prices, and their travel origins/destinations.  In a 
busy urban neighborhood, we assume that numerous users make decisions simultaneously in each 
time interval, and hence their problem resembles a type of Nash equilibrium, i.e. traffic network 
equilibrium; see Sheffi (1985) for a detailed review.   
To derive the lower level equilibrium condition, we first formulate the decision problem of 
each individual user.  To this end, we define ,t n
odL  as the set of drivers who travel between the origin-
                                                          
3 It is also possible to fix garage rates during certain times-of-day, or offer early bird and other discounts, both of 
which can be easily incorporated into the model through additional constraints. 
4 Even if parking is free however, there is still some disutility related to driving to a parking space and walking to the 
destination.  It is assumed that there is a market price for parking, public and private, within the area.  Therefore, any 
user that does not use the system due to excess disutility (as opposed to trouble finding a parking space) is assumed 
to use some alternative parking space in the neighborhood, which is likely a private parking lot such as a restaurant or 
hotel that can provide customers free or discounted pricing. 
5 Because of the policy constraints (1.2)-(1.3), prices may not be at exact market equilibrium. 
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destination pair od OD  at time interval t  who have parking duration n , and 
{ }
, ,
,
t n t n
od j od
j J
L h

  .  
We then define binary variable    | |, ,} 1{ 0l
J
jl jz J    z  as the parking decision of driver 
,t n
odl L , i.e. driver l  chooses to park in area j  if 1jlz  ; or 0jlz   otherwise.  We further define 
disutility 
,
, '
t n t
j od j jd ojn p w v       for users from od OD  to park in area j J  for duration 
 1,2,..., Nn  at time interval t T .  The disutility of the dummy lot , ,, ,
n t n t
od od    is defined as  
   
   
, 1 1
, min (0),  max 1 ' , 
, , 1,2,... , ,... .
t n t
od j r jds
J
s s
oj
j
H n p t t w v
o O d D n N t t t
   



       
     
           (2) 
This is set high enough so that users are assigned to the dummy lot only when real lots are all full, 
but no higher than the intercepts of the demand curves.   
Then for each user ,t n
odl L , the parking decision is made based on the following disutility 
minimization problem: 
,
{
,
}
min
l
t n
j od jl
j J
z




z
             (3.1)
{0,1s.t.  , {  } }jlz j J   ,            (3.2)
{ }
      1 , jl
j J
z l

  ,             (3.3)
,
1
,
, , {1,2,..., }
      ,  
t n
od
t t
jl j l j j j
l L od OD n N
z z jf g c J
   
    .        (3.4) 
Constraints (3.2) and (3.3) make sure that only one parking lot is selected by any user.  Constraints 
(3.4) are lot capacity constraints coupled among all users in ,t n
odL .  It can be seen that problem (3.1)
-(3.4) is a totally unimodular assignment problem, and thus the binary constraint (3.2) can be 
relaxed to  
0 1, { } jlz j J     .           (3.5) 
We further define      , ,t tl l j l jl    λ μρ  as dual variables corresponding to Constraints 
(3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), respectively.  Therefore, we are able to further derive the Lagrangian of 
problem (3.1) and (3.3)-(3.5) as follows: 
 
 ,
,
,
1
,
, , 1,2,...
{ }
,
} { { }
( , ) min 1 1 +
                        
l
t n
od
t n
j od jl jl jl l jl
j J j J j J
t t t
j jl j l j j j
j l L od
l
ODJ n
t
N
l z z z
z z f g c
  
  

 

  




  
 
        
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
z 0
μ ,λ ρ
. (4) 
For the ease of notation, we omit the sub/superscripts t , n , and od  in the remainder of Section 
3.  As such, we derive the first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for each individual 
user’s problem as follows: 
{ }0 0,tjl j jl l jz j J           ,     (5.1) 
{ }0 1 0,jl jlz j J       ,       (5.2) 
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{ }
1 0l jl
j J
z


 

 
 
  ,        (5.3) 
 ,
1
,
, , 1,2,...,
0 0,
t n
od
t t t
j j jl j l j j
l L od OD n N
c z z f g j J 
   
         ,   (5.4) 
where operator   defines the complementarity relationship, i.e. 0x y xy   . 
Since l μ 0  is always feasible to (5.1)-(5.4)
6, the above KKT conditions can be simplified as 
follows: 
 
0 0, { }tjl j l j jz J        ,         (6.1) 
1 }, {0jl j Jz     ,           (6.2) 
and (5.3)-(5.4). 
 
Note that at least one {0, }jl jz J     due to (5.3), and it can be seen that any feasible solution 
to problem (3.1) and (3.3)-(3.5) has * * 0
t
j l j     , * *l j j     and z 0, *jl j j   , where 
*j 
{ }
arg min
j J 
 tj j  . Therefore *z 1,  z 0,  *j l jl j j    .  If we sum up (6.1) over set L  with 
the postulation that l l   , we obtain 
0 }z , {0tjl j j l
l L l L l L l L
j J  
   
          ,      
and it further leads to  
0 }0, {j j L j
t j Jh u         ,            (7) 
where zj jl
l L
h

  and L l
t t
ju    . 
As such, by combining the KKT conditions (for all users) and the market clearing conditions, 
it can be easily seen that (7) and (5.4) lead to the following lower level conditions (8.1)-(8.3) for 
all time intervals within each rolling horizon, which are essentially the lower level equilibrium 
constraints of the MPEC model.  In addition, Constraints (8.4) present market clearing conditions. 
 
(lower level) 
     , ,,0 ' 0,  , , , 1,2,... , ,...t n t t t nj od j jd oj j od s sh np w v u j J o O d D n N t t t                      (8.1) 
   , , ,, ,0 0,  , , 1,2,... , ,...
t n t n t n
od od od s sh u o O d D n N t t t                    (8.2) 
 0 0,   , ,...t tj j j s sc f j J t t t                    (8.3)
 
   , , ,,0 ( ) 0,  , , 1,2,... , ,...
t n t n t n
od j od od s s
j J
u h H u o O d D n N t t t


 
          .       (8.4) 
 
Again, note that the above conditions (8.1)-(8.3) can also be postulated directly from 
Wardrop’s principles, i.e. the users’ behavior collectively satisfies Wardrop’s first principle 
(Wardrop, 1952).  Constraints (8.1) and (8.2) postulate user equilibrium, and Constraints (8.3) 
ensure users cannot violate the physical capacity of each parking area.   
                                                          
6 Since it is ,jl l j J     that affect constraints (5.1) regardless of the individual values of lμ  and lλ , 
l μ 0  is always feasible. 
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As a final remark, the results of the pricing model above include, for all time intervals, the 
price at each parking area, the occupancy level of each parking area, a record of when each user 
arrived and left their parking area, and the disutility of each type of user.  These direct results can 
be used to derive metrics of the system’s performance such as excess driving distance, the 
allocation of vehicles, the amount of demand that did not use the system (referred to as lost users), 
social surplus, and parking revenue. 
 
 
3.3. Solution Method 
The above dynamic MPEC model will be solved to obtain the optimal price of each parking area 
in each time interval.  This difficult problem, given the dynamic time dimension, is approximated 
into multiple subproblems each involving only a subset of the time intervals.  Such subproblems 
will be solved on a rolling horizon for all time intervals ts T  while considering 1   intervals in 
the future.  To develop the solution algorithm, we further assume that the inverse demand function 
( )H u a b u    is linear with respect to the equilibrium disutility u  for each type of demand.  
Parameters a  and b  are respectively the intercept of the demand curve and the demand elasticity. 
For the model with only the occupancy objective (i.e. ,s r  =0), the bi-level MPEC 
subproblems on a τ interval rolling horizon can be solved effectively by reformulation into an 
equivalent single-level mixed integer linear program (MILP) (for details, see Bai et al. 2012; 
2014).  Specifically, this method uses disjunctive integer constraints to reformulate the 
complementarity relationships.   
More generally, for models with additional revenue or social surplus objectives, the bi-level 
MPEC subproblems involve non-convex bilinear revenue terms in the objective function (1.1), i.e. 
 {1,2,. ., }
,
.
t t n
j j
n jN J
p n q
  
   , which makes it highly difficult to find global optimal solutions.  
However, if the rolling horizon interval 1   is chosen (i.e. the model is solved interval-by-
interval in a myopic way), this bilinear term can be reformulated into an equivalent series of linear 
and quadratic terms.  This derivation, based on Hobbs et al. (2000), is presented as follows. 
When   = 1, the subproblems are solved interval by interval, so st t  in all subproblems 
 1,...,st T  .  So we further omit   and st  in the derivation below for ease of notation. 
First, the bilinear term can be rewritten as  
{1,2,..., } { }
,t t
j j
n N
n
J
p n q
 
  
{1,2,...,
,
{ }
,
}N J
t t n
j j od
n od OD
n p h
  
   
, 
due to Constraints (1.5).  If we sum up (8.1) over  1,2,. { ,.., , }n j od ODN J     , we 
obtain the following equation:  
{1,2,..., } { } {1,2,..., } { }
, , ,
, ,
t n t t n t n
j od j j od od
n j od n j oN J OD N J d OD
h n p h u
        
             
      
{ } {1,2,... }
,
,
,
' tj
t n
j od jd oj
j n odJ N OD
h w v

 
   
      .  
Then based on (8.4), we have  
{1,2,..., } { } {1,2,...
, ,
, }
, ,
,
N
t n t n t n t n
j od od od od
n od j n od ODOD J N
h u H u u
    
       .  From 
(8.1)-(8.3) and (1.4), we further obtain
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1
{ }
1
, ,
,
max{1,2,..., 1,} ({ } )
t
j
t t t
j j j j
J
t
t n m t m
j od j
j n od jN OD t NJ m
g
h c f q
 
  
   


 
 
 
    
 
 
 
     .  Therefore, we are able to 
reformulate 
 
,
1,2,..., { }J
t t n
j j
n N
p n q
 
    into the following linear and convex quadratic formulations: 
   , , ,
{1,2,..., } { } {1,2,..., } {1,2,...
,
,
1
,
ma
, } { }
1
x(1, )
'
                                  
t
j
N J N OD N OD
t t n t n t n t n
j j od od j od jd oj
n J
t t
j j j
j n od n od j
t
m t m
j
m t N
g
n p q H u u h w v
c f q
 

 
     






 
      


  

      

{1,2,..., } { }n oN D Jd jO    



 
 

  
. 
With the assumption that  ,t nodH u  is a linear non-increasing function of u , the bi-level MPEC 
subproblems with the revenue objective for each single interval can be solved as an equivalent 
single-level convex mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP).  The reformulated MIQP is thus 
solvable through commercial solvers, albeit in a myopic fashion as opposed to over a rolling 
horizon.  This approach does not apply when   > 1 due to the difficulty in formulating the future 
new users, 
 
1,
1,2,...,
st n
j
n N
q


 , in terms of the current occupancy and users leaving such that the MIQP 
is convex.  We leave this challenging problem of   > 1 for future analysis. 
 
 
4. Numerical Example 
This section presents numerical examples to illustrate the improvements that the proposed dynamic 
pricing model could achieve as compared to current smart parking methods.  We consider a test 
case based off the Marina neighborhood of the SFpark pilot program as shown in Figure 1.  The 
network has |J| = 20 parking areas including 282 parking spaces on 19 on-street block faces (blue 
lines) and 205 spaces in 1 large parking garage (represented as the filled-in blue P parking symbol).  
To simplify the model, rather than considering every possible origin (e.g. all TAZ centroids), the 
trip origins are aggregated at entry/access points to the parking neighborhood, by assuming that 
users have already made their mode choice and are only sensitive to local driving time within the 
neighborhood.  The set of destinations would theoretically include all locations a user may want 
to go to, but for simplicity, they are aggregated at the city block level.  In this example, there are 
three main travel destinations (shown as the green stars) and two travel origins, one at each of the 
two major access points (illustrated by the red cars).  The test case is run over the entire enforceable 
day (9:00am – 6:00pm) with parking prices updated every 15 minutes.   
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Figure 1 - Study area (Marina neighborhood, San Francisco, CA) 
The value of walking (access) time was taken to be θ= $0.42/minute, which is 80% of the 
average hourly wage ($31.77) in the San Francisco area (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013), and 
the value of driving time was taken to be θ' = $0.26/minute, or 50% of the average hourly wage 
(O’Sullivan, 2012).  It is assumed that the parking price can only increase or decrease at most 
$1/hour between each time interval (i.e. r  = l  = $1/hour).  However, no minimum or maximum 
price limit was enforced in this study (i.e. 0   and    ). 
The demand data over time are estimated from TAZ-level O-D estimates provided by SFCTA 
(2009) from their activity-based travel demand model SF-CHAMP.  Vehicle trip data for the five 
different times-of-day periods, i.e. tp = early AM, AM peak, midday, PM peak, evening, as defined 
by SFCTA (2009), were used to fit a multimodal distribution (9) as an approximation of the time-
dependent user demand.  The elasticity coefficient of the linear demand function ( )H   is assumed 
to be 0.3b    (TCRP, 2005), which is very close to Price and Shoup’s (2013) value of 0.28  for 
the Marina neighborhood.  The linear demand curve’s intercept ,t n
oda , for all t, n, and od, is assumed 
to be a function of several properties of typical time-dependent demand; i.e.,  
                                      
2
5
,
1
0,0.25
p
tp
p
t
p
p
t
tt n
od od n
t t
P
a k m e N




 


 

 
 
  
 
 
 ,                                       (9) 
where k is the estimated percent of total vehicle trips to the parking neighborhood that use the 
proposed parking management system, mod is the fraction of the vehicle trips that have OD pair 
od, Ptp is the total number of trips to the parking neighborhood during time-of-day period tp, σt is 
the length of the time-of-day period in hours, μt is the middle hour of the time-of-day period, and 
νn is the fraction of trips that have parking duration n.  To determine mod, it is assumed that two 
thirds of the users enter the study area along the main arterial from the east, with the rest entering 
from the west.  The destinations are each weighted similarly, with 40% attracted to the middle 
destination and 30% to each of the two outer destinations.  The desired parking duration can take 
one of five discrete values: 15 minutes, 45 minutes, 1.5 hours, 3 hours, or 4 hours.  The distribution 
of the parking duration was borrowed from a study of urban parking in Sofia, Bulgaria (Naydenov, 
2010).  Normally distributed random errors were added to each O/D demand and then rounded to 
the nearest whole number; see (9).  Using the resulting values of ,t n
oda  as a medium benchmark 
demand level, we also consider a low demand case and a high demand case which uniformly scale 
the benchmark demand (9) by 0.5 and 2, respectively, before introducing the randomness term. 
Four different parking management scenarios are studied: (i) the traditional scenario where 
drivers have no information at all; (ii) the static information scenario where drivers check parking 
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availability and pricing information only when they start their trips; (iii) the dynamic information 
scenario where drivers are informed with updated parking space availability while driving; and 
(iv) the dynamic pricing scenario where drivers can check updated near real-time availability 
information and prices are allowed to change at every time interval.  Scenarios (i)-(iii) all involve 
static parking prices.  Following SFpark, a typical day was split into three periods, morning (9am-
12pm), early afternoon (12pm-3pm), and early evening (3pm-6pm).  The static parking price in 
each period for scenarios (i)-(iii) was set to be equal to the average price over the corresponding 
time intervals from scenario (iv), so as to have fair performance comparison.  Scenarios (i)-(iii) 
were simulated in MATLAB using the logic similar to the agent-based PARKAGENT model (see 
Levy et al., 2012).  Users choose parking areas according to the same linear demand function as 
the dynamic pricing scenario but may not have complete information in terms of location-specific 
price or current availability depending on the scenario.  After users fail to park in a fully occupied 
parking area, they “cruise” to the next preferred parking area until they give up after having tried 
75% of the areas in the entire neighborhood.7   
The proposed dynamic pricing model in scenario (iv) was solved on a rolling horizon ( =2) 
(when possible) and with three different objectives: (a) the occupancy objective ( ,s r  =0, β=2.5, 
and 𝜏=2) which pushes occupancy levels as close to 85% as possible everywhere; (b) the social 
surplus objective (αs=1, αr=0, β=2.5, and τ=2) which balances the occupancy objective with the 
additional goal of maximizing the system’s social surplus; and (3) the revenue objective (αr=1, 
αs=0, β=2.5, and τ=1) which balances the occupancy objective with the additional goal of 
maximizing revenue.  The reformulated equivalent MIQP of the dynamic pricing model (1.1)-(1.6)
, (8.1)-(8.4) was solved by the commercial solvers, Gurobi and CPLEX, on a personal computer 
with 3.1GHz CPU and 16GB RAM. 
 
Table 1 - Numerical results under three different levels of demand. 
 
 
                                                          
7 A higher “willingness-to-try” percentage decreases the number of users lost, but may increase the total excess 
distance driven. 
Demand Level Performance Metric (i) Traditional
(ii) Static 
Information
(iii) Dynamic 
Information (a) Occupancy
(b) Social 
Surplus (c) Revenue
Total excess distance 
(miles) 122.64 48.52 37.33 0.00 0.65 0.00
Occupancy distribution     
% lot-hrs empty/above target 39.9/48.1 26.1/32.9 26.7/31.9 26.9/0.0 8.1/0.6 15.7/0.0
Lost customers 197 197 197 197 224 418
Social surplus (utils) 3,045 3,242 3,251 3,337 3,413 3,029
Parking revenue $251.97 $190.71 $189.49 $129.23 $190.80 $601.24
Total excess distance 522.27 257.99 166.13 0.00 5.54 0.92
Occupancy distribution 20.6/64.0 7.2/51.7 8.2/50.0 6.3/0.0 7.1/1.7 21.4/0.3
Lost customers 460 414 402 402 410 767
Social surplus 8,946 9,401 9,414 9,724 10,056 8,824
Parking revenue $1,050.38 $970.33 $970.33 $611.07 $661.49 $1,840.78
Total excess distance 1,622.23 1,213.13 721.22 4.91 346.48 3.69
Occupancy distribution 5.4/79.0 0.7/80.7 0.7/81.5 1.8/0.6 2.1/39.2 12.8/0.4
Lost customers 1,514 1,150 1,121 954 927 1,571
Social surplus 25,774 26,508 26,404 27,946 28,971 24,896
Parking revenue $4,033.71 $4,765.75 $4,847.42 $3,637.19 $3,249.96 $5,948.67
Low                   
Medium
High                    
Scenarios
Static Pricing Dynamic Pricing (iv)
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The computational results are summarized in Table 1.  The proposed dynamic pricing model 
is found to generate a number of significant benefits in terms of a reduction in excess driving 
distance, a more balanced occupancy distribution, less lost parking demand due to users’ inability 
to find open parking spaces, and increased social surplus (which can be balanced between 
consumer and producer surplus, i.e. revenue).  We provide a more detailed discussion below. 
 
Circling and congestion reduction. Recall that the primary goal of adjusting parking prices in 
real-time is to eliminate circling -- by ensuring parking spaces are always available at each parking 
area.  This is exactly the objective of dynamic pricing model iv-(a), and Table 1 shows significant 
reductions in excess driving distance.  At low demand levels, all users are able to find a space that 
suits their preferences on the first try, such that there is strictly no excess driving distance.  Adding 
alternative terms to the objective (such as scenario iv-(b), and iv-(c)) puts more weight on 
conflicting goals and can result in some circling.  A high weight on social surplus, as in model iv-
(b), tends to seek small gains in total social surplus at the expense of the occupancy objective and 
congestion reduction.  In model iv-(c), there is less excess driving distance within the 
neighborhood, but due to the significantly higher number of lost users, this congestion is likely 
being diverted to adjacent parking areas (which is not captured in our simulation) and may actually 
be worse than model iv-(a). 
In terms of excess driving distance, the static and dynamic information models show rather 
large improvements over the traditional parking model.  This is expected and is consistent with 
established research.  For example, based off Shoup’s (2006) estimate for the excess VMT 
generated per space per year due to circling, this one-day simulation would generate 3,807 VMT 
from the 282 on-street parking spaces, plus up to 2,767 VMT from the 205 off-street spaces.  
Because the prices for the static pricing are set to equal the average prices from the dynamic pricing 
model which is designed for reducing congestion and emissions, we expect the excess distance 
values of the simulated scenarios (i)-(iii) (although on similar scales)  to be less than these 
estimates, as is shown in our results. 
Our results (for scenario iii) are also consistent with SFpark’s evaluation (Millard-Ball et al., 
2014) which estimates that SFpark reduced circling (or excess driving distance) by about 50% 
since its inception (our results suggest 70%, 68%, and 56% for low, medium, and high demand 
levels, respectively).  Our evaluation also supports that 85% occupancy is an effective threshold 
for reducing circling. 
 
Parking space occupancy. The dynamic pricing model is also able to use prices as a leverage to 
influence users to change parking location based on real-time demand patterns.  This allocation of 
parking leaves fewer lot-hours with zero occupancy (i.e. empty), and almost no lot-hours 
exceeding the target occupancy level in low to medium demand cases.  The ideal parking allocation 
would maintain an occupancy level very close to the target level throughout the system at all times 
despite very high or very low demand.  The dynamic pricing model was found to be the most 
capable of achieving this ideal, as indicated by the high amount of lot-hours that are not empty and 
yet still below the occupancy target.  
 
Lost users. As discussed in Section 3.2, some users will inevitably be “lost” to parking areas 
outside of the system (e.g. private garages, hotels, restaurants).  When comparing different parking 
management strategies, if they all have the same average price they should all have about the same 
number of users lost due to the elastic demand curve.  However, users can also be lost when they 
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cannot find an available parking space and give up looking, either taking their business elsewhere 
or going home, which is undesirable.  So we focus on measuring the number of lost users due to 
capacity limitation, i.e. after they have tried 75% of the lots in the neighborhood and give up.  
Although the number presented in Table 1 represents both types of lost users, the differences in 
this number among the four scenarios are mainly due to capacity limitation. 
From the numerical results, the number of lost users is comparable in all scenarios.  In high-
demand static-price cases, a higher number of users reach the limit of the number of lots they will 
try.  Dynamic pricing, on the other hand, is able to allocate users more effectively to minimize the 
number of full lots, and in turn the number of lost users.  We believe the improved allocation of 
parking helps retain more users and could benefit the local economy. 
 
Social surplus. Another possible metric to consider is the total social surplus.  This is maximized 
when the price is zero, which conflicts with the occupancy objective.  Therefore, a large weight 
on social surplus, as in model iv-(b), could cause poor parking allocations and worsen congestion.  
Model iv-(a) already tends to produce more social surplus than the static price scenarios, so unless 
emissions or external economic benefits were incorporated into the definition of social surplus 
(they are not in these results), then it is better to implement the iv-(a) or iv-(c) objectives. 
 
Revenue. Because the occupancy objective already helps improve social surplus without violating 
the goals of congestion mitigation, a more reasonable secondary objective is to maximize revenue.  
Like the social surplus objective, this objective also conflicts with the occupancy objective, but in 
the opposite direction.  Maximum revenue is achieved by raising prices, thus losing users to elastic 
demand and deviating from the occupancy objective towards an underutilized allocation, until the 
marginal revenue equals zero (because the supply curve is constant).  This results in occupancy 
levels near 50% (under the current linear demand settings) in our numerical examples.  Despite 
the low occupancy level (as seen in the high demand case in Table 1), much more (e.g. up to 65%) 
users are lost.  Therefore, the revenue objective should have a small weight as long as any revenue 
targets (if any) could be met.  As mentioned, a weight of αr=1 was used for the results in Table 1.  
For example, for the high demand case, if the weight is changed to αr=1/3, the lost users can be 
decreased 18% while the revenue only decreases 8% and the parking allocation improves slightly.  
In the low and medium demand cases, a weight of αr=1/3 decreases both the revenue and the lost 
users about equally (22% and 16%, respectively).  The revenue objective is more useful for high 
demand cases where price plays a large role in determining the parking allocation.  In low demand 
cases where many lots will be free anyway, the occupancy objective produces more evenly 
distributed parking allocations. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The dynamic pricing model developed in this paper shows promise to reduce vehicle circling and 
congestion in busy urban centers and positively impact the local economy.  By utilizing real-time 
demand information, prices can be updated and disseminated periodically throughout the day to 
influence drivers’ parking decisions and better allocate vehicles.  By maintaining an occupancy 
level below 85% on each block, circling for parking is found to be practically eliminated.  This 
may not have been possible when pricing tables are only updated every six weeks (as does the 
most advanced parking system to date). 
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The proposed dynamic Stackelberg leader-follower game pricing model can effectively 
capture multiple drivers’ individual choices while making pricing decisions to achieve beneficial 
system objectives.  Our numerical examples show that this modelling framework can balance 
parking occupancy, reduce excess driving distances, lower the number of frustrated users, improve 
social surplus, and potentially increase parking revenue. 
One significant limitation of the proposed model is the omission of competition with other 
parking agencies, i.e. “outside lots.”  As we mentioned in the paper, if the locations, prices and 
capacities of the outside lots are fixed and given, it is trivial to incorporate them in the model.  
However, if there are multiple agencies making pricing decisions at the same time, considering 
them on top of the already highly complex bi-level problem would be a major challenge.  
Nevertheless, the proposed model provides a useful building block for addressing such situations 
in the future.  Future efforts may also consider multiple vehicle types, such as motorcycles, 
compact or electric vehicles, commercial vehicles, etc., or user types, such as shoppers, tourists, 
and commuters who have different price elasticities or even demand curves.  Additionally, the 
model may consider the location of traffic congestion (e.g. those generated by vehicle circling) 
and its impacts on the non-parking traffic.  Before this model can be used by a parking agency, the 
parameters in the model (e.g. those related to drivers’ travel and parking behavior) must be 
calibrated with empirical data.  This may have to be done for each parking agency, but smaller 
agencies could benefit from initial results from cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, or 
Chicago who have already been successful in implementing innovative parking management ideas 
in recent years.  The model’s accuracy can be further improved by using a more advanced demand 
predication model based on both historic data and real-time information collected through sensors 
and/or end-user devices.  Ultimately, we hope this model brings significant benefits in terms of 
reduction of vehicular emissions, growth in the urban economy, improvements in transportation 
mobility, and progress towards sustainable and equitable transportation policies. 
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